This article argues that the existence of adverse selection (worker heterogeneity) can explain the underprovision of general training by employers. High-ability workers value the option to entertain outside wage offers once their abilty becomes known to the market. Offering shortterm contracts is, therefore, a way to screen high-ability types from low-ability types. A firm is not willing to train workers under short-term contracts. Hence, despite the positive returns to training, training may be underprovided in equilibrium. More generally, this article contributes to the literature that seeks to explain the puzzling phenomenon of short-term contracts governing long-term buyer-seller relationships.
Introduction
General training is under-provided in the us economy. This is the sentiment of the popular press, as well as the Commission on Workforce Quality and Labor Market Efficiency.
1,2 On the other hand, there is certainly some provision of general training; according to the Commission, $ billion is spent by firms annually on training.
3 Apparently, then, some firms provide general training in equilibrium, while others do not.
Consequently, a model of the provision of general training must explain cases in which general training is under-provided, as well as cases in which it is provided. The model I present here meets those criteria. It does so by departing from the classic Becker () model in two ways. First, as in the Becker model, it allows workers to "purchase" training by initially accepting a wage below their marginal product. The difference is that this model recognizes that if the workers purchase training from the firm, then an agency problem is created: The firm becomes the workers' agent with respect to training. Therefore, unless provided with incentives, the firm will be tempted to under-provide training or provide low-quality training, since in these ways the firm can reduce its training costs.
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As I show, however, this agency problem alone does not explain the underprovision of training. Consequently, the second point of departure is that I assume that there is worker heterogeneity (adverse selection). With worker homogeneity, the solution to the agency problem involves the firm offering longterm contracts to its workers. With worker heterogeneity, it may become costly for the firm to make such offers. High-ability workers value the option to entertain outside wage offers once their ability becomes known to the market. Hence, to induce high-ability workers to accept a long-term contract, the firm must commit to paying a high level of compensation. However, because the firm cannot distinguish high-ability workers from low-ability workers, the firm could end up overpaying its workers on average. If the cost of overpaying exceeds the returns to training, then training will not occur in equilibrium.
The costs of overpaying will tend to exceed the returns to training when there is a great amount of worker heterogeneity or when the returns to training are small relative to the degree of dispersion in worker ability. The general predictions of the model are, thus, that equilibrium will be described by long-term contracts and training when there is little worker heterogeneity or when the returns to training are large relative to the dispersion in worker ability; when these conditions are reversed, then equilibrium will be described by short-term contracts and no training.
The theoretical contributions of this article go beyond providing as explanation for the under-provision of general training. The model also provides an explanation for why short-term contracts frequently govern long-term relationships: Because low-ability types value the protection provided by long-term contracts, offering short-term contracts could be part of a strategy aimed at identifying high-ability types (i.e., screening out low-ability types). This general insight applies to many situations, including franchising, patent licensing, and other long-term buyer-seller relationships.
It is important to note that this is an "old" paper, the last draft of which was written in . This version is essentially identical to the  version, except some citations have been updated and some of the exposition improved following the good advice of an anonymous referee. In addition, there is a discussion of subsequent developments in the literature since  in Section 4.
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The next section presents the model and considers the case of worker homogeneity. The model has been kept deliberately simple, in order to focus attention on the agency and adverse selection problems. Section 3 investigates the case of worker heterogeneity. Section 4 discusses the results, suggests extensions and other applications, and relates this article to other work. in the field. Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
The Model Basic Assumptions
There are two parties to an employment relationship: a firm and a worker.
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The worker has innate ability α. For convenience, I assume α is drawn from the two-element set {0, A}, where A > 0.
7 Setting the low-ability level equal to 0 is without loss of generality and, as the reader will see, serves to simplify a number of expressions. Due to this assumption, A is also a measure of the dispersion of worker ability. Let θ denote the probability that the worker is high ability. Note that θA is, then, equal to average worker ability. The worker knows his ability.
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Figure 1: Timeline
The firm offers an employment contract to the worker. At the same time other firms (the "outside") are also seeking to hire workers, and the worker could go to work for them. From the contracts offered by the firm and the outside, the worker chooses the one which will lead to the greatest lifetime income. The worker may then receive training. First-period production follows. At the end of the first period, the worker may receive outside wage offers. His current employer can match these offers if it wishes; if it does, the worker remains with his current employer, otherwise the worker changes employer. Second-period production then occurs. Schematically the timing is shown in Figure 1 .
The value of the worker's output in each period is α + τ , where τ is the amount or quality of training the worker initially received. Furthermore, the training is general -if the worker receives training τ from the firm in the first period, but works on the outside in the second period, the value to the outside firm of his second-period output is α + τ as well. For convenience, I assume only the firm is capable of providing training.
8,9
Also for convenience, I assume that τ can take only one of two values: 0 or t, t > 0.
10 I assume the cost to the firm of providing training t is c. In order that the problem be interesting, I assume
Expression (1) captures the idea that it is unprofitable to train a worker who leaves after one period, or, equivalently, has his wage bid up after one period. However, over two periods, there is a positive return to training.
Information and Contract Assumptions
I assume that no employer can observe the worker's ability directly. I do, however, assume that at least one firm, in addition to the worker's current employer, perfectly observes the value of the worker's first-period output. This is admittedly a strong assumption: In many situations, firms other than a worker's current employer cannot perfectly observe his productivity. 11 However, altering this assumption to give the incumbent employer an informational advantage can create a "winner's curse" problem (see Greenwald, , or Lazear, ): 12 Concern that the incumbent employer would only let low-ability workers be bid away makes other firms less aggressive in bidding for workers. In turn, less aggressive bidding reduces worker mobility. In the extreme, when worker mobility is eliminated, the main problem with general training, namely that trained workers will be bid away, is also eliminated.
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In some fields, such as law and accounting, one of the worker's outside options is self-employment. Thus, an alternative to the assumption that an outside firm observes the value of the worker's output is the assumption that the worker has the option of self-employment. Obviously, the winner's curse problem does not arise under this alternative assumption.
14
The assumption that the firm cannot directly observe the worker's ability initially has two additional implications. First, the firm does not know the worker's ability at the time it hires him (i.e., an adverse selection problem exists). Second, the firm does not know the worker's ability when deciding whether to train him. Only the first implication is crucial to the model; the second can be relaxed without changing the general predictions of the model.
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There are two types of contracts, long-term contracts and short-term contracts. A long-term contract is a pair of wages, (w 1 , w 2 ), where w 1 is the wage paid in period one and w 2 is the wage paid in period two. A short-term contract is a single wage, w i , to be paid in the ith period. I assume that the firm can fully commit to a long-term contract, in that it can commit not to break the contract unilaterally or to escape it by firing the worker. 16 The firm can, however, "renegotiate" a long-term contract after one period in order to match a higher wage offer. I will consider two possibilities for commitment by the worker: Either the worker can commit to a long-term contract; that is, he can commit not to accept outside wage offers. Or he cannot commit; that is, he remains free to accept outside wage offers. Given the nature of us law, the latter possibility is the more realistic, though the former is useful for illustrating certain ideas. All parties can commit to a short-term contract.
It should be recognized that I am ruling out the possibility of the parties' contracting directly on either training or the value of the worker's work; that is, contracts are incomplete with respect to τ and α + τ . This is important, because in this model the parties have an incentive to write contracts contingent on training or the value of the worker's output. Although incomplete contracts can be difficult to justify theoretically (see Hart, , for a discussion), 17 this is not an unreasonable assumption to make here: With complete contracts, there would be no under-provision of training; the observation that there is under-provision means that, for some reason, contracts must be incomplete.
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Finally, I assume that prior to first-period production the outside firms bid a wage equal to the worker's average ability; that is, the outside offers the short-term contract, w 1 = θA.
Training with Worker Homogeneity
As a benchmark, consider the situation in which α can take only one value, α. Suppose first that the worker can commit to a long-term contract. There exists an equilibrium in which the worker signs with the firm and training is provided: The firm offers the long-term contract (α,α). Because outside firms would never offer long-term contracts more generous than (α,α), or short-term contracts more generous than w 1 =α, it can be assumed the worker signs with the firm. Because the worker is committed to stay both periods, the firm's profit if it trains is 2t − c, which is greater than 0, its profit if it does not train. Now suppose the worker cannot commit to a long-term contract. In the second period, competition between the firm and the outside for the worker means that the worker will capture the full value of his output through his second-period wage; that is, he will be paidα if he did not receive training and he will be paidα + t if he did receive training. Nonetheless, a modified version of the "Becker solution" yields an equilibrium in which the worker signs with the firm and training is provided: Suppose the firm offers (α − t,α + t). If the worker signs with the firm and training is provided, then the firm's profit will be 2t − c. If the firm does not train the worker, its profit will be 0. Thus, if the firm signs the worker, it will provide training. Hence, if the worker signs with the firm, his lifetime earnings will be 2α. Given that the outside would never offer long-term or short-term contracts that would yield him greater lifetime earnings, the worker signs with the firm in equilibrium.
To summarize:
Proposition 1 Given worker homogeneity, there exist equilibria in which the worker signs with the firm and receives training, regardless of whether, or not, the worker can commit to a long-term contract. The firm captures all the surplus created by training.
It is important to understand why the firm is willing to provide training even when the worker's wage will be bid up. By committing to a high secondperiod wage (i.e.,α+t), the firm ensures that the worker will never be bid away (regardless of training). Consequently, the firm is guaranteed two periods of the worker's time, which makes training a valuable proposition.
As in Becker (), the worker pays for his training by accepting a firstperiod wage below his ability (market). Note that this "Becker-like" solution works here because the worker and the firm sign a long-term contract: the firm bonds itself to train through the promise of a high second-period wage. As the worker is assured of training, he is willing to pay for it by accepting a first-period wage below his ability.
close to θA (or equal to θA if the firm's fraction of the market is taken to have zero measure).
Worker Heterogeneity
In this section, I consider the case where there is worker heterogeneity and, thus, adverse selection. To begin, consider three general results. These results provide intuition for what follows, as well as lay the groundwork for the formal analysis.
First, given a short-term contract, the firm's profit if it trains is
where E {α} denotes the expected ability of the worker in equilibrium. If it does not train, its profit is E {α} − w 1 . Because t < c, one has:
Result 1 Under a short-term contract, the firm never trains the worker.
If the worker signs with an outside firm initially, his lifetime earnings will be θA + α, because he will receive θA in the first period and α, the value of his output, in the second period (the latter as a consequence of competition in the second-period labor market). Thus,
Result 2 In equilibrium, the lifetime earnings of an α-type worker must be at least θA + α if he signs with the firm.
Finally, consider any long-term contract (w 1 , w 2 ). If the worker is committed to the contract, then his lifetime earnings are w 1 + w 2 regardless of his type. If the worker is not committed, then his lifetime earnings are w 1 +max{w 2 , α+τ }.
From this it is clear:
Result 3 Under any long-term contract, (w 1 , w 2 ), the lifetime earnings of a low-ability worker, y 0 , cannot be less than y A − A, where y A is the lifetime earnings of a high-ability worker under that contract.
Result 3 formalizes the intuition given in the introduction, namely that longterm contracts tend to be a relatively better deal for low-ability workers than for high-ability workers.
An important extension of Results 2 and 3 is that if the firm offers a longterm contract and the high-ability worker signs that contract, then the lowability worker must also be willing to sign that contract. To see this, recall that a high-ability worker will accept a long-term contract only if y A ≥ θA + A. By Result 3, y A ≥ θA + A implies y 0 ≥ θA, which, by Result 2, is the condition for the low-ability worker to want to sign that long-term contract.
The Worker Cannot Commit to a Long-Term Contract
Assume that the worker cannot commit to a long-term contract; that is, he is free to accept outside wage offers. There are three different regions of parameter values to be considered:
Region I: min{θA, θt} ≤ 2t − c; that is, there is a high probability that the worker is low-ability or the amount of dispersion in worker ability is small relative to the net returns on training;
Region II: θ(1−θ)A ≤ 2t−c < min{θA, θt}; that is, there is a high probability that the worker is high ability or the amount of dispersion in worker ability is modest relative to the net returns on training; or
that is, there is great uncertainty over the worker's ability or the amount of dispersion in worker ability is large relative to the net returns on training.
Depending on the value of t, the second region may not exist. Beginning with Region I:
Proposition 2 If the parameter values lie in Region I; that is, there is a high probability that the worker is low-ability or the amount of dispersion in worker ability is small relative to the net returns on training, then there exists an equilibrium in which the firm hires both types of worker and provides training. The contract offered by the firm in equilibrium is the long-term contract (θA − t, t). Neither, type of worker captures any of the surplus created by training.
Proof: The contract proposed by the firm is similar to the Becker-like solution employed in Proposition 1: the first-period wage, θA−t, is below average ability and, in this way, the worker pays for his training. The promised second-period wage is set sufficiently high to make the firm's promise of training credible: Given that the parameters lie in Region I, the firm's profit is greater if it trains than if it does not train. If the firm trains, then its expected profit is 2t − c; 20 that is, the firm captures the net returns from training. From Results 1-3, that is the best for which the firm can hope -because of offers from the outside, the worker is able to capture the expected value of his ability. Hence, the firm has no incentive to deviate by proposing another contract. Finally, as neither type can do better going on the outside initially, both types of worker are playing a best response by signing with the firm at the beginning of the first period.
In terms of empirical implications, Proposition 2 says that one should expect to see training in fields where the returns to training are large relative to the amount of dispersion in worker ability. Perhaps more interestingly, Proposition 20 To see expected profit is 2t − c, observe that, prior to the second period, the high-ability worker will have his wage bid up (or quit) and so yields zero second-period profits for the firm, while the low-ability worker will be indifferent to staying or taking an outside offer, so also yields zero profit. Hence, expected profits equal
2 predicts that firms that hire the lowest-ability workers in the labor force will provide training in equilibrium.
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In terms of the worker's payoffs, the contract offered by the firm in the equilibrium of Proposition 2 is similar to a short-term contract in the sense that, for both types of worker, the second-period wage equals the worker's value (i.e., the high-ability worker receives A + t and the low-ability worker receives t). As the next lemma shows, this is a consequence of being in Region I; outside Region I training can only occur under long-term contracts that do not resemble a sequence of short-term contracts. Proof: See Appendix.
As will become evident, the important implication of this Lemma is that if training is provided, then the low-ability type must receive an rent. If that rent is modest, then training will still be provided (Proposition 3). However, if that rent becomes extreme, then no training will be provided (Proposition 4). Whether the rent is modest or extreme depends on whether the parameters lie in Region II or Region III. When the parameters lie in Region II, the following proposition holds: 
Only the low-ability worker captures any of the surplus created by training.
Proof: First, the firm will wish to provide training under this contract. Its expected profit if it trains is
because, in the second-period, the high-ability worker will have his wage bid up. Simplifying that expression, the firm's expected profit from training is
21 There is anecdotal evidence that some firms that hire unskilled workers provide remedial education and other general training (Business Week, September , ).
If it does not train, its expected profit is
However, as θt > 2t − c, it follows that A < W (i.e., the firm is committed to overpay both types if it does not train). So, simplifying, the firm's expected profit if it does not train is
Hence, the firm is just willing to provide training. Given that the firm will train, both types are willing to sign with the firmthe high-ability worker receives lifetime earnings of θA + A (= (θA − t) + (A + t) in terms of first and second-period wages) and the low-ability worker receives lifetime earnings of θA + A − (2t − c)/θ. Because A > (2t − c)/θ, the low-ability worker is capturing some of the returns from training. To complete the proof, I need only check that the firm could not do better by offering a different contract. In light of previous analysis, there are four possibilities to consider: 1) the firm offers a contract that does not induce training, 2) the firm offers a contract that induces training but allows the high-ability worker's wage to be bid up in the second period, 3) the firm offers a contract that induces training and allows no type's wage to be bid up, and 4) the firm attempts to hire and train only the low-ability worker.
Possibility 1:
Recall the worker captures the expected value of his ability, so the largest expected profit the firm can earn without training is zero. In Region II, expression (2) is positive, which means the firm, thus, does better than if it did not train.
Possibility 2:
From Result 2, w 1 ≥ θA − t if the firm is to attract the highability worker. From the Lemma and the preceding analysis, w 2 ≥ W if the worker is to consider the firm committed to training. Because lower wages mean higher profits, (θA − t, W ) must be best.
Possibility 3:
If neither type has his wage bid up, then lifetime compensation under the long-term contract offered by the firm must be at least θA + A (because otherwise the firm could not attract the high-ability worker). Hence, the largest possible expected profit with training is
Because that amount is smaller than (2), the firm has no incentive to offer a long-term contract in which neither type has his wage bid up.
Possibility 4: Finally, if the firm hires only the low-ability worker, it must guarantee him lifetime earnings of θA. The largest possible profit with training is, thus, 2t − c − θA, which is negative outside of Region I. 
Proof:
The proof is nearly identical to the proof of Proposition 3. The only difference is that now (2) is a negative amount. Hence, the short-term contract w 1 = θA is the best contract to offer.
When the net returns to training are small relative to the parameters of worker heterogeneity (i.e., 2t − c < θ(1 − θ)A), then those returns are too small to make training profitable. In order for training to occur, the firm must offer a long-term contract that commits it to train. But, in Region III, the cost of that commitment is so great, as to make it greater than the returns to training.
With the usual caveats about extending from a partial equilibrium analysis, Propositions 2-4 can be seen as suggesting the following: If the economy consists of firms and industries falling into all three regions, then one will see provision of general training by some firms, or in some industries, but not in others. In particular, one should expect to see general training in firms or industries with an approximately homogeneous labor force or where the returns to training are large relative to the amount of dispersion in worker ability. Thus, this model provides insights into both the provision and the under-provision of general training and the circumstances that may determine which we see.
To summarize, when the net returns to training are large relative to the other parameters, training occurs in equilibrium. When those returns are small, training does not occur. Although the high-ability type never captures any of the surplus created by training, in some instances the low-ability type does capture some of the surplus. In terms of the firm's expected profit, Region I is the best -the firm attains the maximum possible expected profit -while Region III is the worst -the firm attains an expected profit of zero. Finally, the firm always offers a contract in which the high-ability type's wage is bid up.
The Worker Can Commit to a Long-Term Contract
Now, suppose the worker can commit to a long-term contract. Surprisingly, even though contracts can now be written in which the worker commits, the firm will not offer contracts in which the worker is asked to commit himself. Thus, commitment by the worker is not the answer to the problems identified in the previous sub-section.
Proposition 5 In equilibrium, the firm never offers a long-term contract in which the worker is committed to stay (i.e., commits not to accept outside wage offers in the second period).
Proof: ¿From previous analysis, if the firm requires commitment, then the firm must offer lifetime compensation equal to θA + A if it seeks to attract both types of worker; or θA if it seeks to attract only the low-ability worker (from Results 2 and 3, it is impossible for the firm to attract only the high-ability worker). If the firm seeks to attract both types, then its maximum expected profit is
¿From the analysis of the previous sub-section, for each region of parameter values, that is a smaller expected profit than generated by the equilibrium contract for that region. If the firm seeks to attract only the low-ability worker, then its maximum expected profit is (1 − θ)(2t − c − θA). Again, the equilibrium contracts identified in the previous sub-section yield greater profits.
The result that commitment by the worker does not mitigate the problem of under-provision of general training may strike the reader as odd. Yet this result arises for the same reason the firm wanted to allow the high-ability worker to have his wage bid up in the previous sub-section: Given the high-ability worker's "preference" for short-term contracts, the firm must adequately compensate him for committing to a long-term contract; that is, the firm must provide compensation at least equal to θA + A. However, because the firm cannot distinguish high ability from low ability, the firm would have to pay this high level of compensation to the low-ability worker as well. That, however, is too costly. A less expensive way to compensate the high-ability worker for accepting a long-term contract is to exploit the screening potential of not requiring the worker to commit: The freedom to have one's wage bid up is more valuable to the high-ability worker than to the low-ability worker, thus granting the worker this freedom becomes a way to compensate the high-ability worker without having also to compensate the low-ability worker.
Discussion and Extensions Theoretical Contribution
As discussed in the introduction, the idea that an informed party's preference for contract length can be used to screen different types of informed parties is a fairly general one and applicable to a variety of situations: Whenever two parties are asymmetrically informed, then they may be reluctant to enter into a longterm relationship. Specifically, when the informed party's private information is revealed over time, the informed party will be sensitive to contract length. If the informed party loses when the uninformed party (or the market) acts on the information it learns, then the informed party will prefer long-term contracts, as long-term contracts can prevent the uninformed party from acting on what it learns (or they can insulate the informed party from the market). Conversely, if the informed party benefits when the uninformed party (or the market) learns its information, then the informed party will prefer short-term contracts. If both types of informed party exist ex ante(i.e., some win and some lose when their information is revealed), then the uninformed party may use (or attempt to use) contract length as a means of screening the two types.
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Clearly, this explanation for short-term contracts is not limited to the problem of general training. It also applies, for instance, to licensing agreements: Suppose a licensor knows the intrinsic value of its patent, α, while the licensee does not. Interpret the variable τ as investments which enhance the value of the patent (e.g., development of accessories, popularizing the product, or inventing new uses for the product). Due to the asymmetric information about α, it is possible that the licensee will sign only a short-term license and make no investments in the patent. Another example is franchising, where asymmetric information about the franchisee or franchiser leads to short-term contracts, but under short-term contracts neither the franchisee or franchiser may have incentives to invest in the franchise for fear that their investment will be appropriated by the other party. In principle, this problem of asymmetric information leading to inefficiently short contracts can plague any long-term buyer-seller relationship.
The idea that the terms of a contract can convey private information is not unique to this article. To some extent it is the logical extension of the idea that offers (e.g., price bids) signal private information (see Wilson, ) . This idea is also found in Aghion and Bolton (), who consider an incumbent monopolist who signals information through the terms of an exclusive dealing contract; in Spier (), who argues that asking for complete contracts can signal information; and in Aghion and Hermalin () , who argue that laws restricting the terms of private contracts, particularly provisions for limited liability and restrictions on damages for breach of contract, are necessary to prevent inefficient signalling. There are three features of this article that distinguish it from previous work. First, here it is the uninformed party who makes contract offers; thus, this article shows how asymmetric information distorts contracts in screening models. Second, this article addresses the important question of contract length.
23 Third, this article offers insights about human capital acquisition. In addition to this article, Spier () and Diamond () also demonstrated that asymmetry of information could lead to sub-optimal outcomes (relative to a full or symmetric information benchmark). Spier's article is, in many ways, the most general of these. She offers asymmetry of information as a reason why contracts could appear incomplete -that is, appear to lack terms that one might naïvely expect in such a contract. Although her insight is an important one for understanding contract structure, her interpretation that asymmetry of information leads to incomplete contracts is not necessarily the most instructive interpretation. Again, consider the provision of general training: It is not 22 Alternatively, the informed party may use contract length as a signal of its ability.
23 For extreme parameter values in Aghion and Bolton (), there is a separating equilibrium in which one type of monopolist offers a short-term contract and the other type offers a long-term contract. See Aghion and Bolton for a discussion of the relationship between their work and earlier versions of this article.
an ex ante asymmetry of information that makes the contract incomplete (i.e., causes it not to be contingent on the quality of training). It is incomplete because "quality" is an inherently difficult-to-verify attribute. Asymmetry of information explains not incompleteness, but sub-optimality: As noted above, asymmetric information makes it undesirable for the parties to write the longterm contracts that have become necessary, due to contractual incompleteness, to support training in equilibrium. Note that a short-term contract is not an incomplete contract -the parties have contracted on the parameter of interest (here, length) -it is just a sub-optimal one.
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Diamond's article is more closely related to this one. He too considers contract length (in his case, debt maturity). Borrowers with poor-quality projects prefer long-term debt because they prefer not returning to the capital markets once the quality of their projects are revealed. Hence, equilibria can emerge in which debt contracts are short term. Because of transactions costs (e.g., liquidity risk, reappraisal, etc.), short-term contracts could be sub-optimal.
A difference between this article and the literature just cited is that this article demonstrates that asymmetric information can lead to contractual inefficiency in a screening model (in contrast to the signaling models cited above). This is valuable because some inefficiencies that occur with signaling disappear when the model is recast as a screening model (see, e.g., Hermalin and Katz, , for a discussion and an example).
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Hosios and Peters () also consider contract length in a labor-market context, but there is no training in their model. In their model, they explore the possible relationships between the use of contract length to screen types ex ante, as here, and the adoption of technology to detect types ex post (i.e., in their model type is not necessarily revealed by first period production, as here).
Considering worker training per se, Cantor () also explores the relation between contract length and the provision of general training. In Cantor's article, there is no worker heterogeneity. The tension that inhibits efficient provision of training is a dual moral hazard (joint-investment) problem: Training is effective only if both the firm and the employee invest in it. If contracts are too short, then the firm cannot recover its investment, so it underinvests. If contracts are too long, then the rents from training investment are largely captured by the firm, undermining the worker's incentive to invest. The optimal, but second-best solution can, thus, be a contract of intermediate length.
24 See Hermalin and Katz () or Tirole () for a more detailed discussion of what "incompleteness" means in contract theory.
25 Basically, one source of inefficiency in a signaling model is that the behavior of one type, call this type G, of the informed player "imposes" a negative externality on another type, call it B. That is, because the informed player plays one way when she's the G type, she is adversely affected when she is, instead, the B type. She might, consequently, wish to commit -prior to learning her type -to behave differently if she's a G type so that if she proves to be a B type she'll be less adversely affected. Typically, such commitment is impossible and so, from an ex ante perspective, there's an inefficiency. But in the case of a screening model, the uninformed player can sometimes internalize that externality in a way the informed player cannot, thereby eliminating the inefficiency (see Hermalin and Katz, , for details).
The idea that ex ante asymmetric information is what limits contract length is also what distinguishes this article from other studies of contract length (Dye, , and Harris and Holmstrom, ). In those articles, the parties sign shortterm contracts because, as time passes, there is symmetric learning by both parties to the contract about some state.
26 In order to use new information, the parties limit the length of their contracts. In the present analysis, only one side learns over time, as the other side is fully informed at the outset. What determines contract length here is that the two types of informed player differ as to whether they want new information used -the good type (high-ability) does, while the bad type (low-ability) does not. Hence, contract length is determined by the uninformed player's attempt to exploit those differing preferences to screen the two types.
Worker Heterogeneity and Contract Length
In this article, long-term contracts are desirable because training will only occur under a long-term contract. Thus, to the extent the resulting adverse selection leads to short-term contracts, the presence of worker heterogeneity leads to an inefficient outcome (recall the net returns to training, 2t − c, are positive by assumption).
The desire to have general training is only one of many reasons for long-term employment contracts. Another, identified by the implicit contracts literature (Baily, , Azariadis, , and Holmstrom, ), is the surplus created by insuring risk-averse workers against fluctuations in the spot-market wage. To see how adverse selection might undermine such insurance, consider the following simple model: Let α now be the expected spot-market wage for an α-type worker in the second period. Note that, even though first-period production reveals the worker's type, there is fluctuation in the wage for workers of each type. Assume the worker is risk averse with per-period utility u(w), and let CE(α) be the certainty equivalent for the random second-period wage for an α-type worker. Assume the firm is risk neutral. As is well known, under symmetric information, the worker would sign a long-term contract guaranteeing him a wage between CE(α) and α (the actual wage would depend on the relative bargaining powers of the worker and the firm). With asymmetric information, there is no equilibrium in which both types sign a long-term contract if
θA < CE(A) .
The reason for this is that the firm would never agree to a wage greater than θA and the high-ability worker would never agree to a wage less than CE(A). Consequently, if expression (3) holds (as it would, e.g., if the worker is not too risk averse or if there are relatively few high-ability workers), then the only equilibria would be pooling equilibria in which both types signed short-term 26 Similar learning also explains why the ability to renegotiate a contract can be beneficial in some settings (see Hermalin and Katz, , and Edlin and Hermalin, ). contracts (no insurance is provided), or separating equilibria, in which only the low-ability worker signs a long-term contract.
27
A third reason for long-term contracts is to restrict turnover in order to minimize hiring costs, insure workforce stability, and prevent employees taking clients or secrets.
28

Conclusion
This article has offered an explanation for the under-provision of general training by employers. It did so employing a model that was flexible enough not only to explain the cases where training does not occur, but also to explain the cases where it does occur. In doing so, the article also offered an explanation for the prevalence of short-term contracts in employment relationships. The key to this explanation was the recognition that workers are heterogeneous with respect to ability and, thus, an adverse selection problem exists.
Worker heterogeneity creates different preferences over contract length. Able workers prefer contracts without long-term commitments, as they want to be free to accept higher outside wage offers when their ability is recognized. Consequently, to induce able workers to accept long-term contracts, firms must offer a high-level of compensation. However, firms cannot distinguish able workers from less able workers. Thus firms will, with positive probability, end up overpaying low-ability workers. This inability is costly for the firms, so they may ultimately prefer not to offer long-term contracts.
Unfortunately, without a long-term contract, firms will not be willing to provide training. Thus, as a consequence of worker heterogeneity, it is possible that no training will be provided. Whether training is provided depends on whether the costs incurred by long-term contracts are greater than the returns to training. The cost of long-term contracts increases with greater dispersion in worker ability and with greater uncertainty over worker ability; hence, if the amount of dispersion in ability is small or there is little uncertainty, then there is training in equilibrium. If those parameters are large, then there is no training in equilibrium.
This article also argued that this is a general insight: Asymmetric information creates a bias toward short-term contracts. Clearly, this has implications for a wide range of contracting problems, some of which were discussed. As noted, this insight is, in turn, part of an even broader proposition: When there is asymmetric information, the terms of a contract may be required to do "double duty"; not only are they used to set the terms of trade, but they are also used to convey information. As it is only the former duty, and not the latter duty, that determines efficiency, it becomes clear that with asymmetric information, one can no longer presume that private contracting will yield efficient outcomes.
